Drawing on recent discussions of the material cultures of markets and of financial innovation as bricolage, this article explores the development of Island, a new sharetrading venue set up in 1995. We examine Island's roots in a very specific conflict in the US financial markets and in the information libertarianism of 'hacker culture', and examine the material bricolage involved in Island's construction. The article also outlines the processes that led to a dramatic 'Latourian' change of scale: Island was originally a 'micro' development on the fringes of US markets, but within little more than a decade key features of Island became close to compulsory, as the nature of North American and Western European share trading changed utterly.
vice versa. Such changes of scale are rare events, but we are dealing here with one of them: Island has become a continent.
What we mean by that is that Island was the paradigm (in the more profound of the two main Kuhnian senses) 2 of the modern North American and Western
European trading of shares: it became the single most influential exemplar of how shares should be traded. Island charged unprecedently low fees. It was the first trading venue fully and deliberately to facilitate entirely automatic trading. The practice of co-location (of placing trading firms' servers right next to a trading venue's 'matching engine') was first introduced by Island. 'Rebates' -an incentive crucial to the contemporary economics of share trading, explained below -began with
Island. In the late 1990s, these were features Island voluntarily chose. Within a decade, they became close to necessary: they are features that by around 2008 it was hard for a share-trading venue in North America, Western Europe and East Asia not to have. They are increasingly to be seen too in 'emerging markets': Brazil, in particular, has a very active automated-trading sector.
The history of Island speaks to an apparent dichotomy in scholarship on markets. On the one hand, the propagation of Island's model -its emphasis on automatic trading and on the importance of speed, its low fees and novel form of market incentive -invokes well-known discussions of how innovators transform fields (Fligstein, 1996) and of the processes that generate institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1986) . On the other hand, Island references the importance of materiality and its associated cultures (cf. Miller, 2005) . Influenced by work in """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 2 As Kuhn (1970: 145) notes, the notion of the paradigm as the successful exemplar, the 'concrete puzzle-solution', is '[p] hilosophically … deeper' than what became its standard interpretation as a constraining framework of thought. Exemplars are crucial because they are key cultural raw materials of 'bricolage' (see below).
science and technology studies (Pinch and Swedberg, 2008) and perhaps also by a strong tradition of ethnographies of exchange (e.g. Geertz, 1978) , a recent sociological tradition focuses on how artefacts are implicated in constructing, maintaining and transforming markets. This tradition takes account of the cogs, to borrow Chakraborrty's metaphor. Think, for instance, of canonical studies of market devices that coordinate valuation and are generative of economic action (Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Beunza and Stark, 2004; Preda, 2006) . Island was one such device:
through code, cables and computers, it orchestrated an electronic marketplace.
Studies of fields and of calculative devices are, however, relatively disconnected. They appear to deal with phenomena of different sizes and scopes: the macrostructures of fields and institutions versus the microstructures of calculation and exchange. In this paper, we bridge this apparent divide through history. Studying the trajectories taken by market devices and the institutions they enable allows us to see a crucial aspect of how the markets around us, to paraphrase David (1985) , got to be the way they are. For example, histories of market devices make visible forms of cultural work that shape broader economic structures. Like bicycles, machine tools and genomic techniques, market devices -from trading pits to trading screens, from cheques to point-of-sale systems -are as much cultural projects as they are feats of engineering. They are, however, often not 'big culture' projects, but -at least initially -'little culture' projects, rooted in local struggles and in material 'bricolage' (see below) guided by local priorities.
Island is a case of that kind in two ways. First, its roots were in an exceptionally sharp but very specific conflict within the trading of shares on NASDAQ at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s. The side in the conflict out of which Island evolved often saw itself as challenging finance's established order and
contesting the privileges of insiders. Second, Island exemplified a specific thread within computer programming in the United States: 'hacker' culture (Levy, 1984; Turner, 2006) . This was and is libertarian (although by no means always in the leftwing sense of libertarianism), committed to opening up technologically or socially closed systems, and hostile to over-restrictive forms of intellectual property. Our title highlights these two aspects of Island: conflict with the established order of trading and the culture of 'information libertarianism'. Island was a capitalist enterprise -a very successful one -but it was shaped also by these two forms of dissent.
Culture, bricolage, and market technologies
What are markets made of? Sociology has challenged the 'ontological indeterminacy' (Lie, 1997: 342) of markets that characterizes neoclassical economic thought: its lack of attention to the specific material and cultural forms that markets take. Markets are 'social arenas where firms, their suppliers, customers, workers, and government interact' (Fligstein and Dauter, 2007: 107) . They are not an ahistorical abstraction, but rather are formed by tangible social elements, be they institutional fields structured through resource and power differentials between agents (Fligstein, 1990 (Fligstein, , 2001 DiMaggio and Powell, 1986) , relational networks that define the possibilities of action and shape the dynamics of exchange (Granovetter, 1985) , or collections of actants that articulate valuation (Callon, 1998; Callon and Muniesa, 2005) .
It is that last answer to the question 'what are markets made of?' that is particularly relevant here. 'Performativity' scholars have answered: markets are made of calculation, but calculation embedded not just in social networks; rather, the focus in the approach inspired by Callon has been on calculation created through the interactions between humans and their 'prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc' (Callon, 2005: 4) . It is a distributed form of calculation (Hutchins, 1995) , a cognitive system in which pattern recognition and categorization is coordinated across and between both multiple human beings and instruments of different sorts (e.g. Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007 not the mechanical implementation of a grand plan nor simply logical deduction from existing scientific theory (or, in the case of finance, from economics -a reading of the idea of performativity that surely cannot be correct).
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"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 3 In everyday French, 'bricolage' is 'do-it-yourself' or tinkering. 'J'ai bricolé une bibliothèque' would ordinarily mean 'I knocked together a bookcase'. The term was introduced to the Anglophone social sciences by Lévi-Strauss (1966) , and although he sought to separate the scientist from the myth-making bricoleur, sociologists of science seized on 'bricolage' as a fertile metaphor for the way innovators 'redeploy … pieces of culture in new ways to perform new tasks' (Barnes, 1974: 58) . 4 Riles, for instance, is right to dismiss the 'notion of the financial market as a offshoot of science ' (2010: 796) : that version of the performativity of economics -the idea that economics, even in the narrow academic sense, is sometimes actively drawn on in the very construction of markets, rather than simply providing passive 'external' representations of them -is clearly incompatible with the bricolage hypothesis. This is not the place for an extended discussion of recent critiques of performativity such as Riles (2010) and Bryan et al. (2012) , but let us briefly say that it should not be read as a version of the simplistic linear model of technological innovation, which does indeed see technological change as an 'offshoot of science'. The arguments against the linear model are, e.g., briefly summarized in MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985: 8-9 ).
Island is a good test of the bricolage hypothesis because it is tempting to see it -harbinger as Island was of what has become a hegemonic form of market -as simply a product of contemporaneous 'big culture' ideologies such as neoliberalism.
Indeed -on the face of it -Island was the product of a man with a plan. Its cofounder Josh Levine, had a 'dream', as the main existing source on Island puts it, and in the new trading venue that dream was to 'come alive' (Patterson, 2012: 107) .
While not disputing Levine's centrality, we will argue, as suggested above, that his 'dream' was initially forged quite locally, in a very specific material-cultural struggle.
Indeed, the bricolage hypothesis strikes us as likely to hold more generally. Neither economics nor ideology defines singlehandedly the constitution of markets. Even in a case in which there is an explicit ideological commitment to a particular idea of the marketplace -in the US, the main market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) long advocated mechanization as imperative for financial markets -the making of devices involves putting together, retuning and refashioning systems.
To be successful this bricolage has to be oriented towards local situations and immediate problems as well as wider goals, and it sometimes inverts the relationship between ends and means. The makers of finance's technologies help to shape the mise-en-scène, but they do so by drawing on existing materials to solve concrete problems.
The bricolage hypothesis has a corollary: history matters. If innovation is shaped by local experiences and local priorities and consists mainly of the creative reuse of existing resources, then those experiences, priorities and resources can have lasting effects. Again, this corollary -the essential historicity of innovation -is widely accepted in technology studies, where the canonical illustration is David's (1985) example, the QWERTY keyboard: a configuration shaped by the specific )"
exigencies of mechanical typewriters that has remained entrenched even after such typewriters have nearly vanished. If historicity is also present in finance, it means that the outcomes of local struggles and local culture can be consequential. As Riles (2010: 795) argues, 'finance is an explicit politics … a purposeful and stated compulsion of self and others, a realm of must, shall, and will'. Devices permit and compel, just as laws, regulations and ideologies do, and if their histories matter, then the 'explicit politics' of finance is shaped locally as well as globally.
Sources
Island has attracted little attention in the academic literature. We know of only three papers that discuss it, all by economists (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2001; Biais, Bisière and Spatt, 2003; Hendershott and Jones, 2005) , and none of these investigates what we are interested in: how Island was shaped and what its consequences were for the evolution of financial markets. Our examination of these issues draws on three sets of primary sources. First is the primary-source documents that remain available on the website (josh.com) of Island's co-founder, Josh Levine: particularly useful are the source code of the most crucial part of Island's computer system, its 'matching engine' (Levine, n.d.) ; a guide (anon., n.d.) to WATCHER, the system out of which Island developed; and a compilation (anon., 1995-97) of the messages sent to WATCHER users between March 1995 and December 1997.
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The second set of sources is interviews. We interviewed Matt Andresen, who was appointed Island's CEO in 1998, and four of its employees. 6 These interviews form part of a larger corpus of interviews (numbering 110 in total), which we have """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 5 Unfortunately, messages before March 1995 appear no longer to be extant. 6 Because these Island employees went on to work for automated trading firms, and that is a publicityshy sector, we draw on those interviews anonymously, citing only the date of the interview. Island's co-founder, Jeffery Citron, did not respond to our request for an interview.
conducted with those involved in the mechanization of trading venues and of trading itself (we draw on this wider corpus mainly when discussing the processes that led
Island's features to become all-pervasive in share trading in the US). Levine met with [author's name], but preferred to answer our questions by email rather than be interviewed face-to-face: we sent him these questions in two large batches, to which he responded in January and May 2012. Levine also made available to us a corpus of email messages he wrote to provide information for a Wired article about Island (Brekke, 1999) .
Contemporaneous articles, such as Brekke's, in the financial and other press form our third set of sources. In addition, after the empirical sections of this article were drafted and circulated to Levine and our interviewees, a popular book in which Island features heavily appeared (Patterson, 2012) . Its overall tone is somewhat sensationalist, and some passages involve authorial imagination rather than documented history. However, these passages aside, its factual narrative is generally well-sourced, and we draw on it in a number of places below.
NASDAQ broker-dealers versus 'SOES bandits'
The immediate context of the emergence of Island was not its Broad St neighbour, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but geographically dispersed 'over-the-counter'
share trading (i.e. trading outwith exchanges such as NYSE). To trade shares, overthe-counter broker-dealers, wherever they were located in the US, were forced by 1930s' regulations to join a regulated securities association. Of the several organizations that emerged, one came to dominate: the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), established in 1938.
Trading in NASD took place over the telephone rather than on a trading floor. Christie and Paul Schultz (1994) , who found that in many stocks NASDAQ broker-dealers avoided posting quotes -bids to buy shares, or offers to sell them -in odd eighths of dollars (!, ", # or $). (In the early 1990s, the tradition in the US of quoting securities' prices in eighths of dollars was still in force.)
Avoiding odd eighths may sound like a minor aspect of the 'cogs' of financial markets, a mere numerical curiosity, but it had a substantial economic consequence.
Retail investors wanting to buy or sell NASDAQ shares in effect had to do sodirectly or indirectly -via the broker-dealers (small retail brokerages which were not broker-dealers transmitted customer orders to the latter), and while large institutional investors had some alternatives (notably Instinet, a system, owned by Reuters, designed to bring institutional buy and sell orders together), they also often in practice needed to trade via broker-dealers. Instead of the latter competing with each other to reduce the 'spread' between the price at which they would buy and the price at which they would sell shares to its minimum (an eighth of a dollar), NASDAQ's broker- Quite unanticipated by either NASDAQ or the SEC, SOES almost immediately began being used for quite a different purpose: intra-day trading. A number of firms -first the small New Jersey brokerage Allstate Investment Group (Donlan, 1988) , then others, often based in lower Manhattan, such as Datek and
Broadway Trading -started either employing traders or offering self-employed traders the capacity to use SOES to create trading positions in NASDAQ stocks that
they would later quickly unwind, often at a profit. By the middle of the 1990s, over 2,000 people were doing this full time, many in and around Broad Street. 7 Visiting
Island's offices on the sixth floor of 50 Broad St, with its 'cramped halls and stained ceiling tiles' (Brekke, 1999) , two Forbes journalists were also taken into second-floor rooms occupied by Broadway Trading. They walked 'through a sparsely furnished office suite' into 'a dimly lit, makeshift trading room':
There, from 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. each weekday, sit 50 people all males eyes firmly attached to monitors. The players are mostly under 30, wearing T shirts, blue jeans and baseball caps. They talk to one another even as they pound on the keyboards. More often they just stare intently or blurt insults at the screens (Schifrin and McCormack, 1998) In the opinion of NASDAQ's broker-dealers, such traders were 'SOES bandits': professionals who were cutting into their profits by exploiting the requirement -designed to protect lay investors -that the SEC had placed upon broker-dealers to honour their quotes when orders were received electronically via SOES. It was, for example, typical for each NASDAQ stock to have an 'ax': a brokerdealer firm that monitored trading conditions in that stock most closely and altered its quotes appropriately. Other broker-dealers would then follow suit, but a 'SOES bandit', monitoring his or her screens more intently than an employee of the brokerdealer, was often able to act more quickly, for example buying shares from one broker-dealer and later selling them to another at a higher price. 8 NASDAQ brokerdealers tried and failed to use regulation to shut 'bandits' out of SOES: in December """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 7 The estimate of over 2,000 comes from James Lee, then President of the Electronic Traders Association (Harris and Schultz, 1998: 41) . 8 This was not the only trading strategy of the 'bandits': others included 'momentum trading' (identifying rises or falls in prices that were likely to persist for at least a short period) and spotting when a large institutional order was being 'worked' and e.g. buying shares ahead of it (GAO, 1998: 10-11). 1988, the SEC approved a proposal from NASD to prohibit the use of SOES by 'Professional Trading Accounts', but the rule was successfully challenged legally.
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Endless legal skirmishing continued, however, as did verbal aggression and even death threats to SOES bandits. Physical violence took place on at least one occasion.
A member of staff of a NASDAQ broker-dealer located at 43 Broad St, infuriated at being 'SOES-ed' by Datek's traders, crossed to 50 Broad St, and barged into Datek's trading room, screaming 'You did it again, I'll fucking kill you!' He leapt at one of the Datek traders, and a more senior trader picked up a letter opener and stabbed him forcibly, fortunately only in the shoulder (Patterson, 2012: 87) .
The expression 'SOES bandit' was, it seems, a deliberately pejorative coinage by the NASDAQ broker-dealers. However, not all the connotations of 'bandit' were entirely misplaced, because at least some of those involved did see themselves as outsiders, even rebels. Mike Bellafiore, a trader who worked for Datek in the late 1990s, told us:
[W]e were rebellious in the fact that we weren't working at names of banks that you knew … and we were rebellious in the sense that we didn't have to go to work in a suit … we were rebellious in the fact that we had a little bit more flexibility when we could come and go. … [A]s long as you were making money, the firm didn't care much what you were doing (Bellafiore interview)
Such trading could involve occasional gut-wrenching losses -'No one blinked when a chalk-faced guy doubled over a garbage pail and puked violently, never leaving his seat and trading right through the puke' (Patterson, 2012: 113) -and certainly was not always easy. For example, while SOES could be used quickly to create a trading """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 10 Email from Levine, 27 January 2012; Brekke (1999) . Citron's role was primarily the business side of his and Levine's joint ventures, but he did some of the early programming and Levine testifies to his influence: 'pretty much everything I did was … shaped and guided by the long and deep arguments we would have' (email from Levine, 21 May 2012 that greatly reduced the number of keystrokes needed, and eventually also had a facility that automatically calculated the price that gave the order the best chance of being executed. added further features that turned it into a full-blown trading system: giving traders up-to-date information on broker-dealers' changing quotes and other market news, permitting traders to enter orders, and allowing them to send messages either to particular other users or to all the traders using Watcher (email from Levine, 27 January 2012; anon., n.d.; anon., 1995 anon., -97, 15 June 1995 . As Patterson (2012: 90) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 11 Emails from Levine, 27 January and 21 May 2012. SOES orders were always filled at the brokerdealer's quote, but for example inputting a sell order with a price well below the broker-dealer's bid increased the chances of the order being filled (but also carried the risk that the broker-dealer's quote would have changed by the time that happened). (Schifrin and McCormack, 1998) . 'We saw people trying to sell stock at the same prices or overlapping prices, and their orders were going unexecuted', Citron told journalist Dan Brekke. As Citron went on gently to put it (since this kind of behaviour by broker-dealers was at the centre of the 'odd-eighths' scandal): 'There was tremendous inefficiency in the markets' (Brekke, 1999) . Fun. (anon., 1995 (anon., -97, 16 February 1996 At first an 'island' alongside NASDAQ, Citron and Levine's new system quickly became a trading venue in its own right, an outcome that gained 'legitimacy' anonymous 'electronic' book of buy orders and sell orders, along with the prices and quantities bid for or offered. The 'book' was visible to all traders using the system.
12
Island offered users far lower fees than existing trading venues, and Levine invented an incentive, 'rebates', that was to become widely influential. A trader who chose simply to take up a bid or offer in Island's order book was charged a quarter of a cent for each share traded (Biais et al., 2003: 6) . However, a trader who provided liquidity by posting an order in the book that another trader then took up was paid by
Island a tenth of a cent per share for doing so: in other words, was paid a 'rebate'.
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Also distinctive -and far more important than the mere detail it first appears to be -is that prices on Island were denominated in 1/256ths of a dollar: as noted above, share trading in the US prior to Island was almost all done in eighths of dollars. Island's much finer-grained price grid made it possible for those who traded on it -who, as described below, increasingly employed automated-trading systems -to undercut NASDAQ broker-dealers' quotes by posting slightly higher bid prices and slightly lower offers.
14 Previous efforts to automate exchanges had typically involved the exchange's computer system sending out information that was displayed in alphanumerical form on a proprietary screen designed for human beings to view; often, all that was """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 12 Later, a facility was added to permit users to submit orders that would not be displayed in the order book, although in the matching process described below undisplayed orders had lower priority than visible orders. 13 Initially, Island offered a 'order-entry rebate' that went to those who ran the trading systems from which orders were sent, in order, Levine told us, to 'incentivize' them to implement and support the technical interconnection as well as possible. The rebate structure was later changed to that described in the text following Levine's thoughts about the 'price of immediacy' (the cost to a trader who simply took up an existing bid or offer) and 'price of liquidity', the cost to a trader who posted a bid or offer in the order book and thus gave other traders an implicit option (in the financial-market sense): the right but not obligation to take up that bid or offer (email from Levine, 21 May 2012; emphases in original) . 14 This pattern of price setting on Island is clearly documented by Biais et al. (2003) . Island also made it possible for those using automated trading systems to place their servers in 50 Broad St, in the same building as Island's own servers, and so avoid the inevitable delays in using wider computer networks to route orders and cancellations of orders to Island. Initially, this was an informal arrangement (among the many firms that occupied the building's warren of offices was a web-services firm """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 15 RS-232 was a set of standards for the interconnection between computers and peripheral devices, now largely superseded by USB (Universal Serial Bus). ASCII is the standard way of encoding English-language letters, digits and other characters.
#!"
that would host trading firms' servers: interview, 9 December 2011), but again it was a harbinger of what was to become a widespread practice, now called 'co-location'.
As computer equipment was added by both Island and other 50 Broad St firms such as the web-services firm, the demands on the building's electricity supply grew.
Originally, the building's electricity bill was simply divided up amongst its tenants according to the square footage of their offices, but that practice became untenable once tenants not involved in automated trading started to receive huge bills. Indeed, the heat generated by the multiple computers in Island's rooms started to become a real constraint on the addition of further machines (Andresen interview). Such issues were indicators of the new venue's success. By February 1998, when Island still had only four employees, it had captured 4 percent of trading on NASDAQ, and was the third most important mechanism of such trading, after the broker-dealers themselves, who had a 78 percent share, and Instinet (Schifrin and McCormack, 1998 ) but mention of rats in 50 Broad St was not always hyperbole. Traders would often go outside to smoke in narrow, rat-infested New St, """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" Island was also distinctive technologically: two of its newly recruited programmers were immediately struck by differences between Island's system and any other system in the finance sector they had seen: 'first of all, we didn't think it would work, except that it was up and running so clearly it worked' (interview, 18
April 2012). '[B]ack then people were still building things monolithically', in other words having an entire system run on an ultra-powerful, extremely expensive computer (Andresen interview). In contrast, Levine saw no need for expensive hardware, and preferred to use not one machine but multiple, cheap PC central processor units: 'the first version of Island … ran on an AST Bravo Pentium P90. … We used those machines for everything, they were small, fast, and cheap' (email from Levine, 21 May 2012) . 'Josh was like, "no, no, no, I don't want any piece of hardware that costs more than four grand"', says Andresen. The one major exception that was made was an ultra-large-capacity server 'to keep track of everything we've ever done' (Andresen interview).
Island's 'matching engine', the technical heart of its system, was an algorithm called the 'enter2order' procedure, which Levine wrote in FoxPro, a programming language for database management developed by Fox Software: see figure 2. Levine found a simple but hugely consequential 'trick' to speed matching. In Levine's later
paraphrase, what the 'enter2order' procedure did when the Island system received a new order was to:
See if there was a record from a recently cancelled order that we can reuse for this new order. This is hugely important because that record will likely still be in the cache [fast internal memory] and using it will be *much* faster than making a new one. (Levine, n.d.) After generating a 'sequence number and time stamp' for the new order, the algorithm then checked whether the order 'could potentially be filled' by matching it with orders already in the book. If so, Start matching! Starting at the top of the book [if the new order was, e.g., an order to sell, the 'top of the book' is the existing buy orders with the highest price] until we either run out of shares or orders to match against. (Levine, n.d.) Also crucial to the speed of the matching engine was a distinctive design decision that made it possible for the matching engine not to have to pause for 'twophase commits' 18 to check that changes in the order book were being correctly recorded in system memory: the way he [Levine] did it was so radically different from anything I'd seen before … the matching engine … broadcasts out its messages in a stream that everyone reads, it assumes that if I wrote this thing on the wire that everyone else can be responsible for writing it to disk. (interview, 18 April 2012)
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 18 A 'two-phase commit' is the procedure by which a system writes information onto a disk or other form of memory and receives back a message acknowledging that the information has indeed been written. Levine protected the simple, fast elegance of Island's system. Only a very limited number of order types were implemented in the system: essentially, just bids to buy shares at or below a limit price, and offers to sell them at or above a limit price.
It is worth noting that initially
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" (Anon., 1985: 49; see Turner, 2006) . A 'hacker' was both a skilled, dedicated programmer, for whom writing software was a -sometimes obsessive -pleasure, and also a believer in opening up closed systems (see Levy, 1984) . Archipelago. He not only spent many phone calls advising its founder Jerry Putnam, but even sent, gratis, segments of Island's software (Patterson, 2012: 144) .
What Andresen remembers Levine telling him in 1998 ('we could have changed the world') shows that by then Levine had a broader ambition than making money or even simply designing an elegant technical system, and the occasional presence in Levine's phraseology of the turn of phrase of the social activist was, perhaps, not entirely accidental. Trying to persuade the journalist Dan Brekke to focus """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 20 'Those guys' were the programmers who had taken over much of the programming burden from Levine (email from Levine, 1 September 2012).
less on his biography and more on the structure of markets, Levine wrote: 'The people need a good flowchart' (email to Brekke, 12 April 1999) . Exasperated by a vexatious lawsuit by an 'unhappy daytrading customer' (and perhaps also by journalists continuing to focus on 'matters of personalities as opposed to facts') he told Brekke:
'It's likely that I will soon remove and destroy the josh.com website and stop trying to help the people altogether' (email to Brekke, 27 April 1999) .
In his 1999 correspondence with Brekke, '[a]fter about three minutes of thought', Levine spelled out 'seven steps to building a good market':
I think that pure auction markets are the best way to price and trade stocks (and some other things too).
A market should be fair and that fairness should be obvious from [its] design rather than something that needs to be monitored and regulated externally.
A market should encourage the creation and free dissemination of information.
A market's usage fees should be reasonable and cost-based and should encourage participants to behave in ways that are good for the market as a whole.
A market should have low barriers to entry.
A market should be inclusive, not exclusive. The more participants, the better for everyone.
A market's technology should be fast, simple, robust, and scaleable. (email to Brekke, 22 March 1999) #*"
Island becomes a continent
By 1999, these precepts seemed 'mostly common sense type stuff' to Levine (email to Brekke, 22 March 1999) . We have to be careful, however, not to read this 'common sense' backwards in time, as a preformed vision he had always held, nor to overintellectualize it as, for example, a crystallization of free-market economics. 21 Asked by us what had led him to it, Levine gave us not a systematizer's abstract answer but a bricoleur's concrete one, citing his accumulated experience rather than, for example, any author:
With Watcher, we had a lot of experience interacting with markets that were unfair, inefficient, and poorly regulated so we certainly knew what we wanted to avoid (email from Levine, 21 May 2012) It would certainly be quite wrong to read Levine's precepts forward, as a blueprint for what was to come. The 'information libertarian' aspect of them largely did not survive: information might have wanted to be free, but capitalism had other priorities.
No exchange or other trading venue of which we are aware now offers an equivalent of Levine's BookViewer, allowing anyone realtime sight of its order book. The data feeds from trading venues are not free: indeed, they are a vitally important source of revenue for venues. Similarly, Levine might have wanted to stick to a small set of simple order types, but order types have subsequently proliferated and have become far more complex. Island was an influential exemplar, but an exemplar is not a template, and bricolage is not simple copying.
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 21 Patterson (2012: 90-91) reports that in the mid-1990s Levine did read work on the economics of market microstructure, in particular Schwartz (1993) . However, Schwartz (1993) shows only limited enthusiasm for a market form such as Island, instead advocating discontinuous call auctions, such as those implemented in the unsuccessful Arizona Stock Exchange (Schwartz, 1993: 196-207; Muniesa, 2011 Island programmers rewrote Instinet's antiquated system, preserving its familiar interface ('the green screen', as traders called it) but discarding the old, slow matching engine in favour of a design that was essentially Island's. Exchange's Globex system) could normally detect such movements fast enough to avoid being badly 'run over', using OUCH to cancel its exiting bids and offers before they were filled and resubmit them at different prices.
A kind of symbiosis thus developed between Island and electronic marketmaking firms. Island's speed and its rebates (which provided market makers with a source of income additional to the 'spread' between bid and offer prices) gave them what they needed to conduct their business profitably and with reasonable safety, while their constant presence in the order book gave Island the liquidity and the tight 'spreads' that made it an attractive place for trading. Other venues competing with
Island thus had little option but to develop a form of symbiosis of their own. Despite
Levine's help, Archipelago, for example, was initially handicapped by having a matching engine far slower than Island's, an engine that was also limited in its capacity to handle large volumes of orders. Amongst dissatisfied customers was Tradebot's founder, Dave Cummings, who told Jamie Selway, Archipelago's Chief Economist: 'I can't manage that risk', i.e. the danger of being 'run over' in the one or two seconds it could take Archipelago's system to process orders and cancellations.
Selway told the Wall Street Journal that he then spent 'a hundred hours on the phone' with Cummings -who, like Levine, was a skilled programmer -discussing how to make Archipelago's system faster and better able to cope with high volumes (Lucchetti, 2006 in which an order cannot be cancelled, and the German government adopted a draft
Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz requiring algorithm-generated orders to be earmarked as such and high-frequency firms to be licensed. If implemented, the resting-time requirement in particular would be a dramatic change in the market ecology whose evolution we have sketched here.
The cogs, we would argue, are clearly important. Does their history matter?
That is a conjecture, and it could be false. Perhaps the form of market first fully brought into being on Island is a kind of 'attractor', a form towards which trading would be drawn irrespective of local struggles, local culture and path-dependent bricolage of the kind discussed in earlier sections. Something akin to that was argued by the economist Lawrence Glosten in 1994, before Island was even established. 'Is the electronic open limit order book' -the generic kind of market of which Island was a particularly influential variant -'inevitable?' asked Glosten, and he answered the question with at least a tentative 'yes'. '[T]he open limit order book', his theoretical analysis suggested, 'is a stable institution and, within the set of economic environments and trading structures considered, the only stable institution' (Glosten, 1994 (Glosten, : 1128 . It was, in other words, an attractor.
Taken on its own, the history of share trading over the past two decades is compatible with the 'attractor' hypothesis as well as with our 'path-dependent (see table 1 ), subject like all other venues to the pressures of """""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 22 http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html, accessed 6 November 2012 $)" competition and the need for a symbiosis with automated trading: in other words, a story of NYSE becoming simply one part of the large sociotechnical system that share trading has become. 23 NYSE was a car, and has become a cog. Island was a cog that became a car, the archetype of the new socioeconomic and sociotechnical environment within which even the longest-established stock exchange now has to operate. Scales are indeed not stable, and cogs -and their histories -matter.
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""" 23 For a sociological portrait of NYSE on the brink of the process of change discussed here, see Abolafia (1996) . For NYSE's limited but partially successful attempt to 'fold' the social world of its specialists into algorithms, see Beunza and Millo (2012 
